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ABSTRACT 
Since Oregon’s stringent property tax reforms in the mid-1990s, tax limitations have 
created a complex and somewhat unpredictable levy system for local public service 
administrators who rely on property taxes to fund their operations. School districts, in 
particular, have hit the tax limitations and been forced to reckon with expected but 
uncollected (“compressed”) property tax revenue. This study examines the relationship 
between property tax compression rates and school production in Oregon, which we 
measure with the district-wide percentage of eighth grade students who meet or 
exceed state standards in the mathematics assessment. From the Oregon Departments 
of Education and Revenue, we’ve compiled a panel data set on 147 school districts over 
the six academic years from 2006-2007 to 2011-2012. We’ve created an Ordinary Least 
Squares model designed to control for demographic, financial, and fixed district and 
year effects that may affect a district or year’s overall level of student achievement, 
and attempt to isolate the effect that property tax compression has on district 
production. Our results indicate that there is a significant quadratic relationship 
between property tax compression rates and student achievement, such that while low 
levels of compression have positive effects on achievement, compression rates above 
17.33 percent will negatively affect production. Simply put, our results indicate that a 
small amount of tax compression paradoxically benefits school districts, but that high 
tax compression rates bring down a district’s percentage of students who pass state 
mathematics exams.
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Property taxes in Oregon are a messy system, and they are poorly understood by most of the 
state’s constituents. In Oregon, property taxes are based on the lesser of two property values—
assessed value, which is capped at a low growth rate, or real market value, which is determined 
at irregular intervals by county assessors—and a total dollar cap of $15 per $1,000 of that lesser 
value (1.5 percent). When a property tax is levied, it is only collected up to that cap; the amount 
not collected is “compressed” tax revenue, and the uncollected tax as a consequence of the cap is 
“compression.” The major problem with compression is that even when the public votes to fund 
a project or a local government entity with property taxes, that project or entity may not receive 
those funds. Some school districts are losing millions of dollars to tax compression—millions of 
dollars that the community voted to give the district, but that the district can’t collect or spend. 
Moreover, some properties’ “value” is egregiously lower than their sale price. Take, for 
example, the home at 4239 NE 7th Avenue in Portland, Oregon, which sold on April 1, 2014 for 
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$490,000—it is a beautiful, refurbished, 4-bedroom, 3-bathroom Victorian on a corner lot, just 
eight blocks from a Whole Foods grocery store. But in 1996, it was dilapidated, smack in the 
middle of a high-crime neighborhood, and assessed at a value of just $14,030.1 Whoever bought 
that home will pay just $339 in property taxes this year, when 1.5 percent of the $490,000 
purchase price would be $7,350. 
Another potential problem with tax compression is that a service the public has voted to 
fund is not only not actually being funded to the public’s specifications, but has also been “paid 
for” in the voters’ minds, and may therefore garner much less political support for future or 
concurrent supplemental funding, such as from the state general fund. Consider, for example, 
whether a typical citizen would vote to approve a local option levy in their district for $10 
million, if just two years earlier a local option levy for $25 million had passed. Likely, that voter 
would doubt that the district really needed the additional funds. The reality may be that the 
district never collected all $25 million, or even half of it.  
 If this is the case, and property tax compression presents a situation in which a valued 
and demanded service is simultaneously underfunded and hindered from successfully securing 
other public funding sources, then compression could be affecting Oregon’s public services—
including K-12 education—to a degree far beyond what the simple subtraction of collected tax 
from levied tax could tell us. 
1.1 A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF OREGON PROPERTY TAX REFROM AND 
COMPRESSION 
Oregon established its property taxes in the mid-nineteenth century, and almost nothing 
within this system changed until the 1990s. Prior to the changes, Oregon had a levy-based 
system, in which local entities would set their own tax rates based on their needs and estimate 
revenue based on the real market values of area homes. Tax rates varied depending on which 
taxing district a home lay within. These taxes funded schools at a rate no greater than $15 per 
$1,000 of real market value.  
In the 1990s, Oregon saw a rash of statewide ballot measures aiming to radically change the 
property tax system in Oregon. One of the most significant of these was Measure 5--a state 
constitutional amendment passed in 1990 and fully implemented in 1992. This measure placed 
limits on the amount of tax that could be collected from a property. These limits were $5 per 
$1,000 of assessed value for school districts (phased in over three years), and $10 per $1,000 of 
assessed value for general local government expenses.   
In 1997, Measure 50, another state constitutional amendment, further restricted the 
property tax system in Oregon by establishing limits on the growth rates of taxable property 
value, ostensibly to make property tax payments more predictable and to shelter homeowners 
from wild fluctuations in the real estate market. Taxable property value was defined as the 1996 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Figure 8 in appendix for more information on this property’s values and tax rate. 
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assessed value of a property, plus a 3 percent annual increase; this value is referred to as a 
home’s assessed value. (New homes’ assessed values are their original assessed value, plus a 3 
percent annual increase.)  
Tax compression is the effect of a passed tax increase, either in the form of a permanent rate 
increase or a local option levy, hitting the Measure 5 dollar-limit per $1,000 of either a 
property’s Measure 50-defined assessed value or its real market value, whichever is lesser. When 
tax compression occurs, only tax revenue up to each property’s limit is collected and distributed 
amongst the government entities expecting property tax revenue to fund their budgets.  
Local option levies—passed most often by public service districts like fire, police, and 
schools, to fund building renovations or other atypical expenses—are the first in line to lose 
revenue to tax compression. If a levy’s collected taxes for a property are reduced to zero and tax 
compression is still in effect for that property, then permanent rate tax collection is reduced 
until the tax cap dollar-limit is reached.  
This process is complex and confusing, leaving many Oregonians unaware that funding 
measures they supported on the ballot could be limited or eliminated by property tax 
compression. Local government officials and school district administrators themselves may not 
understand or anticipate the effects of tax compression on their revenue stream, and may not be 
accounting for it in their budgets. 
1.2 OREGON PROPERTY TAXES AND K-12 EDUCATION 
Property taxes in Oregon are essentially separated into two pools: taxes for local education, 
and taxes for every other local service. The two pools are taxed at different rates, and face 
different caps, with education funding being the most straightforward to measure and track.2 
Before Measure 5 passed in 1990, property taxes paid for approximately 70 percent of 
Oregon’s public education; by the 2011 school year, property tax revenue averaged just 30 
percent of an Oregon district’s revenue (Linhares, 2011). A cursory glance at the data shows that 
Oregon’s school districts are experiencing property tax compression in greater numbers and at a 
greater magnitude than local governments and other local public services, which makes Oregon 
school districts a prime choice for examination of the real effects of property tax compression. 
1.3 THE LINK BETWEEN TAX COMPRESSION AND STUDENT OUTCOMES  
This study attempts to measure the effects of property tax compression on Oregon’s 
education production by regressing the rate of compressed tax (as a percentage of total tax 
levied) on the percentage of eighth grade students who meet or exceed state standards on the 
mathematics assessment. The primary aim of this research is to determine whether tax 
compression has an effect on school outcomes that is distinct from the effects of the existence of 
a tax cap, or a reduction in overall funding levels. Given that tax compression in a school district 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Fee Figure 9 in appendix for an example of property tax distribution in Wasco County, Oregon.  
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is effectively a measured gap between that district’s voters’ demand for education funding and 
the district’s actual education funding supply, we hypothesize that, at high levels of property tax 
compression, we may see negative results in education production. 
Our principal finding is that property tax compression does have an effect on student 
achievement, significant at the 5 percent level. Tax compression positively affects student 
outcomes (at a diminishing rate-of-growth) until a school district reaches a tax compression rate 
threshold of 8.66 percent, after which point the positive effects of tax compression on student 
achievement begin to decline as the tax compression rate continues to increase. According to our 
model, the effects of tax compression remain positive until a total compression rate of 17.33 
percent is reached; we predict that compression rates above 17.33 percent will negatively affect 
student achievement, although no Oregon district has yet reached that threshold (the highest 
compression rate in Oregon was in Morrow School District in 2012, at 16.83 percent). 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although several economic studies have looked at the link between school district funding 
and student performance, and a few have examined the impact that local tax limits have on 
school districts (both in terms of district funding and district-level student performance), none 
have attempted to answer the question of whether local tax compression has an effect on 
student performance. 
There is a strong basis for investigating the unique effects of compression. While much of 
the existing literature examining the link between school funding and student performance finds 
few to no significant effects (Hanushek, 1986, 1989, and 1997; Hoxby, 2004), research 
examining property tax inputs specifically has found stronger links between tax revenue 
limitations and declines in student performance (Downes and Figlio, 1998; McMillen and 
Singell, 2007). In particular, Downes and Figlio (1998) find that a state’s imposition of tax or 
expenditure limits on local government (including schools) significantly reduces the mean 
student performance in that state on standardized math tests, and that the reduction in scores is 
greater for poorer district areas. The authors use detailed data on individual students from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of the High School Class of 1972 and the National Educational 
Longitudinal Survey to control for demographics, and Census data to determine school district 
qualities, including the existence of local tax limitations, and compare student achievement 
levels on standardized reading and mathematics assessments in 1972 and 1992. They find no 
significant effect on reading scores, but did find relative reductions in the mean mathematics 
score to the order of 5.5 to 6 percent in states that implemented a tax limit in the 1970s or 
1980s.  
Both Dye, et. al. (2005) and McMillen and Singell (2007) find a negative relationship 
between property tax limitations, or “caps,” and school district expenditures. McMillen and 
Singell (2007) find a significant decrease in district-level per-pupil expenditures in states that 
adopted a tax limit reform between 1990 and 2000, but a less-consistent relationship between 
class size and the same districts, suggesting that decreases in revenue most greatly affect non-
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instructional costs. This finding is consistent with what one might expect from a unionized 
school district, in which instructional costs are nearly fixed. Dye, et. al. (2005) examine whether 
the revenue impacts of capped property taxes for school districts compound over time as a result 
of “assessed value” growth limits that err on the conservative side, and they find that while tax 
caps do reduce the growth of total school district expenditures, the effects do not seem to be any 
less binding in the short-run (two to three years) than in the long-run (nine years).  
Although the existence of property tax caps in a district has been linked to lower 
expenditures and lower average student performance on mathematics assessments, no study 
that we know has attempted to measure the relationship between the amount of property tax 
lost to the cap and these same outcomes. Relatively little is known about the relationships 
between lost—compressed—property tax revenue and school district inputs or production. By 
measuring the rates of compressed tax revenue relative to the expected total tax revenue of a 
district, we hope to capture the unique effects of tax compression in the education production 
function—namely, the disconnect between a community’s demand for education (the levied tax) 
and its true education inputs (the collected tax).  
3. HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
We believe there are unique effects captured by property tax compression, more complicated 
than the simple fact of an imposed tax limitation. Compression in a school district represents a 
disconnect between the district’s demand—on the part of the voters—for education funding of a 
certain caliber, and the district’s actual education supply; the rate of compression essentially 
measures the magnitude of that disconnect. It stands to reason that, at high levels of property 
tax compression, we may see negative results in education production. 
Is property tax compression affecting Oregon’s public school outcomes? We are testing this 
question by examining the relationship between a district’s tax compression rate and its student 
achievement levels, which we are measuring with the district’s percentage of eighth grade 
students who meet or exceed Oregon state standards in the annual statewide mathematics 
assessment. We expect to find that an increase in a district’s tax compression rate leads to a 
decrease in student achievement levels.  
Eighth grade mathematics assessment scores are a well-established gauge for education 
production (Hanushek and Raymond, 2005; Hoxby, 2004), and they may best capture the true 
effects of a school district’s contribution to a student’s learning. By age 13, students have 
surpassed the period during which their performance levels in school are largely dictated by 
parental involvement and guidance, but are not yet running up against the complications of high 
school-level measurement, where math classes and ability levels can range from pre-algebra to 
college-level integral calculus. Comparatively, reading tests are too easily susceptible to a 
student’s interest and ability level developed outside of the classroom. Controlling for 
demographic and financial effects that may affect a district’s overall level of student 
achievement, we hope to isolate the effect that property tax compression has on district 
production.  
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3.1 REGRESSION EQUATION 
We have run an Ordinary Least Squares regression to test our hypothesis. 
Our final regression equation is as follows: 
(1) MathSuccess  =      β0  + β 1 TaxCompressionRate  + β 2 TaxCompressionRate2  + 
β 3 logStudentCount  + β4 MinorityPercentage  +  
β5 MinorityPercentage2  +  β6 Free/RedLunchPct  + β7 Year  +  
β8 Year  + β 
Our endogenous variable, MathSuccess, is the percentage of eighth grade students who have 
met or exceeded the Oregon state standards for mathematics in a given school district during a 
given academic year, measured on a scale of 0 percent to 100 percent (not as a decimal). Our 
exogenous variable-of-interest, TaxCompressionRate, is the percentage of the total property tax 
levied (the permanent tax plus any local option levies) in a given school district during a given 
academic year that was compressed, calculated as the total number of compressed dollars 
divided by the total number of levied dollars and measured on a scale of 0 percent to 100 
percent. TaxCompressionRate2 is the square of the variable TaxCompressionRate.  
Other exogenous variables included in our final regression are: logStudentCount, the log of 
the total number of students in a given district during a given academic year; 
MinorityPercentage, the percentage of the total number of students in a given district during a 
given academic year who are non-white, measured on a scale of 0 percent to 100 percent; and 
MinorityPercentage2, the square of the variable MinorityPercentage. To capture fixed effects in 
each district each year, we’ve also included the binary exogenous variables Year and District. 
We expected to find a negative relationship between TaxCompressionRate and 
MathSuccess, with the presumption that each percentage-point unit of TaxCompressionRate 
represents a fairly significant portion of a district’s expected budget, and that it is missed when 
lost. In the case of the Crow-Lorane-Applegate School District in 2012, illustrated in Figures 1 
and 2, the lost tax revenue constitutes one-sixth of the district’s expected property tax revenue, 
or—assuming that property taxes in Crow-Lorane-Applegate roughly match the statewide 
averages for local funding totals (Linhares, 2011)—fully 5 percent of the district’s operating 
budget for the year. It is hard to imagine that this wouldn’t negatively impact the district’s 
production, and, all the more so if tax compression is unexpected by school district 
administrators.  
4. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The data sources for the empirical analysis are the Oregon Department of Education’s 
annual reports on school district budgets, demographics, and assessment results, as well as 
property tax compression data compiled in 2013 by the League of Oregon Cities from the 
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Oregon Department of Revenue’s annual reports on property tax levies and collections, which 
are specific to school district and county. 
We’ve compiled a panel data set that spans the academic years 2006-2007 to 2011-2012 and 
includes observations from each Oregon school district each year on the following: the total 
number of students in the district, as well as the percentage of non-white students and the 
percentage of students on free or reduced lunch programs; the percentage of eighth grade 
students who’ve met or exceeded state standards in mathematics; the district’s total operating 
budget, as well as the district’s breakdown budgets for capital expenditures, instruction, and 
support services; and finally the district’s rates of permanent rate tax compression, local option 
levy tax compression, and total (combined permanent rate and local option levy) tax 
compression, each expressed as a percentage of the tax levied by the district. Figures 1 and 2 
illustrate the calculation of the three tax compression rates for the Crow-Lorane-Applegate 
School District in Lane County in 2012. 
We’ve mapped our annual data as follows: tax compression data for 2007 is based on the 
results of the 2006 election cycle (which affected the 2006-2007 school year budgets); district 
budgets, demographics, and assessments results for 2007 are based on the reports published 
July 1, 2007 (which correspond to the 2006-2007 school year). 
FIGURE 1 
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FIGURE 2 
 
After several tests, we determined that not all collected variables were relevant to our final 
regression equation. The primary problem we encountered was high correlation between 
explanatory variables: the three measurements of tax compression (permanent rate, local option 
levy, and total, which is the combined permanent rate and local option levy) and the four 
measurements of school district budgets (the operating budget and its summary parts: capital 
expenditures, instruction, and support services). Because of this correlation, identifying the 
primary funding link(s) to district rates of meeting or exceeding math standards was less 
straightforward than we had hoped. In our final regression equation, we dropped all of these 
variables except for the total tax compression rate. 
We also found that our data on student demographics were not as explanatory of 
MathSuccess as we had anticipated. Variables for the percentages of black, white, and Hispanic 
students in each district were highly insignificant in multiple regression variations, as were 
variables for the percentage of students in each district qualifying for the free lunch program or 
the reduced lunch program; all of the lunch program and individual ethnicity variables were 
dropped, although MinorityPercentage, the percentage of non-white students in each district, 
including but not limited to black and Hispanic students, was included in our final regression.  
The insignificance of the government-assisted lunch program variables was particularly 
surprising to us, as we’d hypothesized that low household incomes would negatively impact 
MathSuccess and hoped to capture that effect with this data as a proxy. Table 1 presents 
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summary statistics of our regression’s variables, excluding variable manipulations (such as logs 
and squares) and the binary variables for district and year. (See Table 4 in the appendix for 
summary statistics of collected variables that were not included in our final regression.) 
Observations of our explanatory variable-of-interest, TaxCompressionRate, ranged, within one 
standard deviation of the mean, from 0 percent to 4.3 percent. 
 
There are 192 school districts in Oregon, but after dropping 45 districts for which we could 
not gather consistent data on tax compression, our dependent variable of interest, we landed at 
a still-sizable collection of data: 147 districts over six academic years, or 882 observations. 
Data on the percentage of students in each district enrolled in a English as a Second 
Language (ESL) program, the talented and gifted (TAG) program, and in a special education 
program, such as a student individualized education program (IEP), would have been desirable, 
as we suspect that there are strong correlations between qualification for these programs and 
performance on state standardized tests. Given the time constraints of this research project, 
however, it was not possible to obtain this data. Budgets for each program were easily accessible, 
but they are not reliably reported from district to district or even from year to year, and so they 
did not yield helpful contributions to our analysis. 
We also would have liked to examine the relationship between tax compression and eighth 
grade student outcomes over a much longer time period—ideally, beginning as early as the 1991-
1992 academic year, at the outset of Oregon’s property tax reform. Although this time span may 
have given us a more complete answer to our research question, it also would have created 
several problems, the most significant of which would have been accounting for the alterations 
to state standards for eighth grade mathematics assessment in 2001-2002 and 2006-2007. 
5. RESULTS 
We find that high levels of compression are linked to significantly lower student 
performance. Our regression results, shown in Table 2, indicate that tax compression does have 
a significant effect, at the 5 percent level, on the percentage of eighth grade students who meet 
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or exceed state standards in mathematics, and that whether the effect is positive or negative 
depends on the magnitude of the compression rate.  
 
The coefficient estimates for our tax compression variable, a positive coefficient (1.56) for 
the linear term and a negative coefficient (-0.09) for the quadratic, indicate a relationship 
between tax compression and student outcomes that begins positively and then, at a certain rate 
of compression, tips into a diminishing trend. To identify that “tipping point” we took the 
derivative of the equation 
(2) y  = β0  + β1 TaxCompressionRate  + β2 TaxCompressionRate2 + β 
(3) y’  = β1  + 2 * β2 TaxCompressionRate 
and, setting Equation 3 equal to zero and using the coefficient estimates from Table 2 for β1 and 
β2, solved for a TaxCompressionRate “tipping point” of 8.66 percent. 
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
As is roughly illustrated in Figure 3 above and Table 3 below, tax compression significantly 
and positively affects student outcomes, at a diminishing rate-of-increase, until a school district 
reaches the 8.66 percent threshold, at which point the positive effects of tax compression on 
MathSuccess begin to decline as TaxCompressionRate increases. According to our model, the 
effects of tax compression remain positive until a total compression rate of 17.33 percent is 
reached.  
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Though no district in Oregon has yet reached a total tax compression rate of 17.33 percent 
(the highest rate in our data set was 0.5 percentage-points shy, at 16.83 percent, in Morrow 
School District in 2012), our model predicts that tax compression at this rate or higher will have 
a significantly negative effect on student outcomes.  
We attribute the positive effects of tax compression on student achievement to two 
possibilities. First, because compression is a consequence of reaching a funding cap, the districts 
that are experiencing compression are at least attempting to maximize their tax base, and they 
collected significant revenue given their constraints. Second, there may be a state general fund 
mechanism that replaces lost property tax revenue to school districts but that overcompensates, 
doling funds in excess of the compressed revenue.  
We believe the eventual negative effects of tax compression may be related to the same state 
general fund mechanism, which likely maxes out at a certain level of replacement funding, as 
well as to budget cut constraints faced by school districts due to union contracts with teachers 
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and staff. Or, potentially, due to enormous temporary expenses such as construction costs, 
which, if our sense is correct and tax compression is largely unanticipated by local 
administrators, may have been committed to after a local option levy was approved but before 
collected tax revenues fell short of projections.   
5.1 THE DIFFERENCES IN DISTRICTS OVER THE “TIPPING POINT” 
Twenty-six observations in our dataset reached the 8.66 percent “tipping point” for total tax 
compression rate; half of those observations included local option levies.3 Downes and Figlio 
(1998) find a stronger negative relationship between tax limits and student outcomes in poorer 
school districts, specifically those districts with lower per-pupil expenditures in the base year of 
their analysis, so in closer examination of the differences between districts with high rates of 
compression and those low or no compression, we turned our attention primarily to district 
funding levels. When comparing the per-pupil operating budgets for the two district groups in 
Figure 4, we find that “tipped” districts seem to be fairly representative of the center distribution 
of all districts (i.e., the means and standard deviations are comparable across the two groups). 
Neither the richest nor the poorest districts are included in the “tipped” group. 
FIGURE 4      
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Table 5 in the appendix for summary statistics of “tipped” districts. 
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Looking at per-pupil capital expenditures across the two district groups, we see that “tipped” 
districts are spending less: the mean and standard deviation for “tipped” districts are $622.19 
and $1,072.55, respectively, while the mean and standard deviation for all districts are $859.97 
and $2,485.99, respectively. Nearly 15 percent of all districts are spending more on capital 
expenditures than the maximum amount spent by a “tipped” district; half of all districts are 
spending more than the average “tipped” district. This data seems to support the findings of 
McMillen and Singell (2007), in that the compression-imposed revenue constraints of Oregon’s 
“tipped” districts appear to be channeled towards non-instructional budget cuts. 
6. CONCLUSION   
This study attempts to measure the effects of property tax compression, tax revenue 
expected but not collected due to tax caps, on Oregon’s education production by regressing the 
rate of compressed tax (as a percentage of total tax levied) and school district demographic data 
against the percentage of eighth grade students who meet or exceed state standards on the 
mathematics assessment. The primary aim of this research is to determine whether tax 
compression has an effect on school outcomes that is distinct from the effects of the existence of 
a tax cap, or a reduction in overall funding levels. 
The principal finding of our research is that property tax compression does have an effect on 
student achievement, significant at the 5 percent level. Tax compression positively affects 
student outcomes, at a diminishing rate-of-growth, until a school district reaches a tax 
compression rate threshold of 8.66 percent, after which point the positive effects of tax 
compression on student achievement begin to decline as the tax compression rate continues to 
increase. According to our model, the effects of tax compression remain positive until a total 
compression rate of 17.33 percent is reached; we predict that compression rates above 17.33 
percent will negatively affect student achievement.  
While the results of our study establish a significant relationship between property tax 
compression rates and school outcomes, further examination of the state funding mechanisms 
that tax compression triggers would illuminate the counter-intuitive result that low rates of 
compression have positive effects on student achievement. We have suggested two possible 
explanations for these results: 1) that districts levying any local option are at least attempting to 
maximize their tax base, and therefore constitute a self-selected group of proactively managed 
districts, and 2) that there exists a state funding mechanism that replaces or attempts to replace 
lost tax compression revenue to school districts, but that does so imprecisely, effectively 
overcompensating the district. Further research on this subject should closely examine the 
equations used by the state for any general fund adjustments made after a district’s experienced 
tax compression. Furthermore, a more complete picture of the constraints school districts face 
in making budget cuts, when presented with lower-than-expected property tax revenue, may 
also contribute to our understanding of tax limitations and education; our results suggest that 
school districts in this position are making cuts to capital expenditures, which seems consistent 
with previous findings (McMillen and Singell, 2007), but more research is needed. 
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7. APPENDIX 
       FIGURE 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Vedder and Davis 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Fall 2014   
 
32	  
   FIGURE 9   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Vedder and Davis 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Fall 2014   
 
33	  
 FIGURE 10 
 
 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Vedder and Davis 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Fall 2014   
 
34	  
 
 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Vedder and Davis 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Fall 2014   
 
35	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Vedder and Davis 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Fall 2014   
 
36	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
For helpful comments, unwaning interest, and seemingly undivided attention, we are grateful to 
our advisor, Professor Joe Stone. 
REFERENCES 
A Brief History of Oregon Property Taxation. Salem: Oregon Dept. of Revenue, 2009. PDF File.  
City Property Tax Data. Salem: League of Oregon Cities, 2013. PDF File. 
Coate and VanderHoff. 1999. Public School Spending and Student Achievement: The Case of 
New Jersey. Cato Journal, 19:1, 85-99.  
Downes and Figlio. 1998. School finance reforms, tax limits, and student performance: Do 
reforms level-up or dumb down? Memo, Tufts University, Cambridge, MA.  
Dye, et. al. 2005. Are Property Tax Limitations More Binding Over Time? National Tax Journal, 
Vol. LVIII, No. 2, 215-225. 
Eberts, Stone and Hollenbeck. 2004. Teachers’ Unions, Outcomes and Reform Initiatives. 
Teachers’ Unions and Education Policy. Henderson, et. al. eds. Elsevier Press  
Eberts and Stone. 2002. Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes. Journal of 
Human Resources, 37:4. 913-27. 
Hanushek and Raymond. 2005. Does School Accountability Lead to Improved Student 
Performance? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 24, No. 2, 297-327.  
Hanushek and Raymond. 2004. The Effect of School Accountability Systems on the Level and 
Distribution of Student Achievement. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(2-
3): 406-415.  
Hodge, et. al. 2013. Tax Base Erosion and Inequity From Michigan’s Assessment Growth Limit: 
The Case of Detroit. CESifo WP no. 4098. 
Hoxby, 2004. Productivity in Education: The Quintessential Upstream Industry. 
SouthernEconomic Journal, 71(2), 209-231. 
Hoxby. 2001. All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal. Q. J. E. 116:4, 1189 1231.  
Hoxby. 1998. How Much Does School Spending Depend on Family Income? The Historical 
Origins of the Current School Finance Dilemma. American Economic Review. Vol. 88, No. 
2, 309-314. 
Linhares. 2011. Recent History of Oregon’s Property Tax System: With an Emphasis on Its 
Impact on Multnomah County Local Governments. Ed. Provost. Portland: Multnomah 
County Tax Supervising and Conservation Committee. PDF File.  
Oregon Undergraduate Research Journal  Vedder and Davis 
Volume 7 Issue 1 Fall 2014   
 
37	  
 
McMillen and Singell. “School Finance Reforms and Property Tax Limitation Measures.” School 
Finance Reforms and Property Tax Limitation Measures: Fiscal Decentralization and 
Land Policies. Ed. Ingram and Hong. 2007, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Cambridge:Lincoln 
Institute of Land Policy, n.d. Print. 
Neal and Schazenbach. 2007. Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based 
Accounting. NBER WP no. 13681. 
Oregon Property Tax Statistics, Fiscal Year 2012-2013. Salem: Oregon Dept. of Revenue, 2013. 
PDF File. 
“Public Education in Oregon.” Oregon Blue Book. Oregon Secretary of State, n.d. Web. 9 March 
2014.  
SPECIAL REPORT: Voter-Approved Tax Levies Losing More Money Than Ever Before. Salem: 
League of Oregon Cities, 2013. PDF File. 
Where The Money Goes: A Report on City Property Taxes. Salem: League of Oregon Cities, 
2013. PDF File.  
 
